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#### Obama is using PC to hold the line on Iran sanctions now

Haaretz 1/22 Will AIPAC-Obama sanctions clash dent pro-Israel lobby’s clout?, 1/22/14, http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-news/1.569900

In previous AIPAC vs. White House dustups, the pro-Israel lobbying group’s strategy was to speak softly and let Congress carry the big stick.¶ But in the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s face-off with the Obama administration over new Iran sanctions, congressional support may not be so readily available and keeping a low public profile is proving impossible.¶ According to congressional insiders and some of the pro-Israel lobbying group’s former senior executives, AIPAC may soon face a tough choice: Stick out the battle over sanctions and potentially face a reputation-damaging defeat, or reach out to the White House and find a way for both sides to save face.¶ “I don’t believe this is sustainable, the confrontational posture,” said Steve Rosen, a former AIPAC foreign policy chief known for his hawkishness on Iran.¶ The Obama administration has taken a firm line against the sanctions bill backed by AIPAC, warning that the legislation would harm prospects for a achieving a diplomatic solution on the Iranian nuclear issue. Meanwhile, the confrontation has landed AIPAC squarely in the media spotlight and drawn pointed criticism from leading liberal commentators.¶ AIPAC has been stymied by a critical core of Senate Democrats who have sided with the Obama administration in the fight. While AIPAC’s bid to build a veto-busting majority has reached 59 -- eight short of the needed 67 -- it has stalled there in part because Democrats have more or less stopped signing on.¶ Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), the bill’s sponsors, rounded up 15 Democrats when the bill was introduced on December 19, just before Congress went on its Christmas recess. Since Congress returned this month, however, they have added just one Democrat, Michael Bennet of Colorado.¶ AIPAC, however, says its bid to pass sanctions is on track.¶ “Our top priority is stopping Iran's nuclear program, and consequently we are very engaged in building support for the Menendez-Kirk bill which now has the bi-partisan co-sponsorship of 59 senators,” AIPAC’s spokesman, Marshall Wittman, wrote in an email to JTA. “This measure would provide our negotiators with critical leverage in their efforts to achieve a peaceful end to Iran's nuclear weapons program.”¶ But in a recent interview with The New Yorker, President Obama appeared confident that backers of the bill would not reach a veto-proof majority.¶ “I don’t think a new sanctions bill will reach my desk during this period, but if it did, I would veto it and expect it to be sustained,” Obama said.¶ A source close to AIPAC said the stall in support for the legislation is due in part to the fact that of 10 committee chairmen opposed to the bill, four are Jewish and have histories of closeness to the pro-Israel community.¶ Non-Jewish lawmakers tend to take their cues on Israel-related issues from their Jewish colleagues -- a common template with lawmakers from other communities -- and this is no different, the source said.¶ AIPAC’s determined push on sanctions is drawing some anger from Democrats. A number of party insiders say that staffers on Capitol Hill are referring openly to AIPAC as an antagonist on the Iran issue in private conversations.¶ “Now it just looks like AIPAC is backing a partisan bill rather than pushing a bipartisan policy to stop Iran," said a former Democratic Hill staffer who deals in Middle Eastern issues and, like many others, asked not to be identified because of the issue’s sensitivity.¶ AIPAC’s efforts have spurred surprisingly blunt criticism from sources that are more known for caution on such matters. The new director of the National Jewish Democratic Council, Rabbi Jack Moline, earlier this month in an interview with JTA accused AIPAC activists of using “strong-arm” tactics on uncommitted senators.¶ Douglas Bloomfield, who served as AIPAC’s legislative director in the 1980s and is now frequently critical of the group, warned that with most Democrats inclined to back Obama on this issue, the confrontational posture taken by AIPAC could wound its reputation down the road.¶ “There could be repercussions across the board with a lot of members of Congress the next time they say they want them to go to the barricades,” he said.¶ AIPAC already is taking some high-profile hits on TV, with liberal commentators accusing the lobby of trying to scuttle a diplomatic settlement with Iran.¶ “The senators from the great state of Israel are against it,” comedian Jon Stewart said last week on “The Daily Show,” accompanied by a graphic of a map of Israel emblazoned with the AIPAC logo. MSNBC host Chris Hayes said the 16 Democratic senators backing the sanctions bill are “afraid” of AIPAC.¶ Rosen said that such exposure, while irritating to AIPAC, would not be a factor in getting the lobby to shift course. More serious would be calls from donors to the group who have ties to Democrats. AIPAC’s reputation as having bipartisan support -- a critical element of its influence -- could be put at risk.¶ “AIPAC puts a premium on bipartisan consensus and maintaining communication with the White House,” said Rosen, who was fired by AIPAC in 2005 after being investigated in a government leak probe, though the resulting charges were dismissed and he later sued AIPAC unsuccessfully for damages.¶ Rosen noted AIPAC’s forthcoming policy conference in March; such conferences routinely feature a top administration official -- the president or vice president, the secretary of state or defense. At least one of these failing to appear “would be devastating to AIPAC’s image of bipartisanship,” he said.¶ A way out for the group would be to quietly negotiate a compromise behind the scenes with the White House, Rosen said.¶ “They don’t want to be seen as backing down,” he said of his former employer, “but the White House is good at helping people backing down without seeming to back down.”¶ AIPAC hardly stands alone in advocating the sanctions, said an official from another Jewish group, noting that support for the bill spanned the breadth of the community from the right-wing Zionist Organization of America to the consensus-oriented Jewish Council for Public Affairs. None of these groups, including AIPAC, wanted a confrontation, the official said.¶ "It's awkward, and the pro-Israel organizations have been looking for a way to climb down from this question,” said the official, who asked not to be identified.¶ However, the official said, the Obama administration has taken a confrontational approach. The official cited a pointed remark by National Security Council spokeswoman Bernadette Meehan who suggested earlier this month that congressional backers of the sanctions legislation actually favor war with Iran and “should be up front with the American public and say so.”¶ “There seems to be a concerted effort by the White House to say we’re not going to blink," said the Jewish organizational official.

**Any small action links – hardliners hate any engagement with Cuba**

**Laverty, 11** – former Senior Program Associate at The Center for Democracy in the Americas (Collin, “Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”, 2011, http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA\_Cubas\_New\_Resolve.pdf)//eekg

In the interim, these recommendations could make an important difference. They would put the interests of the United States into alignment with the humanitarian interests of the Cuban people, send a long overdue message of encouragement to the advocates of reform on the island, and demonstrate that our country is finally ready to move beyond Cold War policies of the past and modernize our approach toward Cuba for the 21st Century. None of these actions would sit well with the hardest of the hardliners in the Cuban American community or their representatives in Washington. Their terms of surrender for Cuba, as Phil Peters pointed out in his Cuban Triangle Blog, are written into the statutes of the U.S. embargo. In Congress, legislators including Representatives Mario Díaz-Balart, David Rivera and others, are trying to reverse President Obama’s travel reforms, dialing back family travel and remittances to the levels imposed by President Bush.134 They will certainly fight actions that loosen restrictions to help push along Cuba’s economic reforms.

#### Deal key to prevent war

Shank and Gould 9/12 Michael Shank, Ph.D., is director of foreign policy at the Friends Committee on National Legislation. Kate Gould is legislative associate for Middle East policy at FCNL, No Iran deal, but significant progress in Geneva, 9/12/13, http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/cause-conflict-conclusion/2013/nov/12/no-iran-deal-significant-progress-geneva/

Congress should welcome, not stubbornly dismiss, diplomatic efforts to finalize the interim accord and support the continued conversation to reach a more comprehensive agreement. The sanctions that hawks on the Hill are pushing derail such efforts and increase the prospects of war. ¶ There is, thankfully, a growing bipartisan contingent of Congress who recognizes that more sanctions could undercut the delicate diplomatic efforts underway. Senator Carl Levin, D-Mich., chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, cautioned early on that, “We should not at this time impose additional sanctions.” ¶ Senator Tim Johnson, D-S.D., chair of the Banking Committee, is still weighing whether to press forward with new sanctions in his committee. Separately, as early as next week, the Senate could vote on Iran sanctions amendments during the chamber’s debate on the must-pass annual defense authorization bill.¶ This caution against new sanctions, coming from these more sober quarters of the Senate, echoes the warnings from a wide spectrum of former U.S. military officials against new sanctions. There is broad recognition by U.S. and Israeli security officials that the military option is not the preferred option; a diplomatic one is. ¶ This widespread support for a negotiated solution was highlighted last week when 79 national security heavyweights signed on to a resounding endorsement of the Obama Administration’s latest diplomatic efforts.¶ Any member of Congress rejecting a diplomatic solution moves the United States toward another war in the Middle East. Saying no to this deal-in-the-works, furthermore, brings the world no closer toward the goal of Iran giving up its entire nuclear program. Rather, it would likely result in an unchecked Iranian enrichment program, while the United States and Iran would teeter perilously close on the brink of war. ¶ A deal to prevent war and a nuclear-armed Iran is within reach and it would be dangerous to let it slip away. Congress can do the right thing here, for America’s security and Middle East’s stability, and take the higher diplomatic road. Pandering to harsh rhetoric and campaign contributors is no way to sustain a foreign policy agenda. It will only make America and her assets abroad less secure, not more. The time is now to curb Iran’s enrichment program as well as Congress’s obstructionism to a peaceful path forward.

#### US-Iran war causes global nuclear war and collapses the global economy

Avery 11/6 John Scales, Lektor Emeritus, Associate Professor, at the Department of Chemistry, University of Copenhagen, since 1990 he has been the Contact Person in Denmark for Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War, 11/6/13, http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm

Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences.¶ As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems.¶ The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy.¶ In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result.¶ Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.

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**Text: The United States federal government should coordinate emergency oil spill response efforts with Cuba per the recommendations of Bert and Clayton.**

**Recommendations solve -**

**Bert and Clayton ’12** – Captain of the US Coast Guard/military fellow (U.S. Coast Guard) at the Council on Foreign Relations and a fellow for energy and national security at the Council on Foreign Relations (Captain Melissa and Blake, “Addressing the Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill,” Policy Innovation Memo 15, *Council on Foreign Relations*, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/addressing-risk-cuban-oil-spill/p27515)//CT

As a first step, the United States should discuss contingency planning for a Cuban oil spill at the regular multiparty talks it holds with Mexico, the Bahamas, Cuba, and others per the Cartagena Convention. The Caribbean Island Oil Pollution Response and Cooperation Plan provides an operational framework under which the United States and Cuba can jointly develop systems for identifying and reporting an oil spill, implement a means of restricting the spread of oil, and identify resources to respond to a spill.

Washington should also instruct the U.S. Coast Guard to conduct basic spill response coordination with its counterparts in Cuba. The United States already has operational agreements in place with Mexico, Canada, and several countries in the Caribbean that call for routine exercises, emergency response coordination, and communication protocols. It should strike an agreement with Cuba that is substantively similar but narrower in scope, limited to basic spill-oriented advance coordination and communication. Before that step can be taken, U.S. lawmakers may need to amend the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 to allow for limited, spill-related coordination and communication with the Cuban government.

Next, President Barack Obama should issue an export-only industry-wide general license for oil spill response in Cuban waters, effective immediately. Issuing that license does not require congressional authorization. The license should allow offshore oil companies to do vital spill response work in Cuban territory, such as capping a well or drilling a relief well. Oil service companies, such as Halliburton, should be included in the authorization.

Finally, Congress should alter existing oil spill compensation policy. Lawmakers should amend OPA 90 to ensure there is a responsible party for oil spills from a foreign offshore unit that pollutes or threatens to pollute U.S. waters, like there is for vessels. Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Congressman David Rivera (R-FL) have sponsored such legislation. Lawmakers should eliminate the requirement for the Coast Guard to obtain congressional approval on expenditures above $150 million for spills of national significance (as defined by the National Response Plan). And President Obama should appoint a commission to determine the appropriate limit of liability cap under OPA 90, balancing the need to compensate victims with the desire to retain strict liability for polluters.

There are two other, less essential measures U.S. lawmakers may consider that would enable the country to respond more adeptly to a spill. Installing an early-response system based on acoustic, geophysical, or other technologies in the Straits of Florida would immediately alert the U.S. Coast Guard about a well blowout or other unusual activity. The U.S. Department of Energy should find out from Repsol about the characteristics of Cuban crude oil, which would help U.S. authorities predict how the oil would spread in the case of a well blowout.

**Narrow tailoring avoids Cuba links to politics – empirically similar to other emergency response coordination in the squo**

**Bert and Clayton ’12** – Captain of the US Coast Guard/military fellow (U.S. Coast Guard) at the Council on Foreign Relations and a fellow for energy and national security at the Council on Foreign Relations (Captain Melissa and Blake, “Addressing the Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill,” Policy Innovation Memo 15, *Council on Foreign Relations*, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/addressing-risk-cuban-oil-spill/p27515)//CT

Efforts to rewrite current law and policy toward Cuba, and encouraging cooperation with its government, could antagonize groups opposed to improved relations with the Castro regime. They might protest any decision allowing U.S. federal agencies to assist Cuba or letting U.S. companies operate in Cuban territory.

However, taking sensible steps to prepare for a potential accident at an oil well in Cuban waters would not break new ground or materially alter broader U.S. policy toward Cuba. For years, Washington has worked with Havana on issues of mutual concern. The United States routinely coordinates with Cuba on search and rescue operations in the Straits of Florida as well as to combat illicit drug trafficking and migrant smuggling. During the hurricane season, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides Cuba with information on Caribbean storms.

The recommendations proposed here are narrowly tailored to the specific challenges that a Cuban oil spill poses to the United States. They would not help the Cuban economy or military. What they would do is protect U.S. territory and property from a potential danger emanating from Cuba.

Cuba will drill for oil in its territorial waters with or without the blessing of the United States. Defending against a potential oil spill requires a modicum of advance coordination and preparation with the Cuban government, which need not go beyond spill-related matters. Without taking these precautions, the United States risks a second Deepwater Horizon, this time from Cuba.

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#### Interpretation – Economic engagement has to be government to government

**Daga, 13** - director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in Bolivia, and a visiting senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation (Sergio, “Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic:

U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela”, National Center for Policy Analysis, 5/15, <http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message_to_Debaters_6-7-13.pdf>)

Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government economic engagement with private economic engagement through 3) international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with respect to some countries than to others

Violation – They have the USFG license the development of Cuban oil

#### **A) limits – a government limit is the only way to keep the topic manageable – otherwise they could use any 3rd party intermediary, lift barriers to private engagement, or target civil society – it makes topic preparation impossible**

#### **B) negative ground – formal governmental channels are key to predictable relations and trade disads and counterplans that test ‘engagement’**

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#### Security threats are political constructions by experts to justify constant militarism.

Rana 12, - Aziz, Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School; A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School; PhD., Harvard University, July 2012, “NATIONAL SECURITY: LEAD ARTICLE: Who Decides on Security?,” 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1417

Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what makes today's dominant security concept so compelling are two purportedly objective sociological claims about the nature of modern threat. As these claims undergird the current security concept, this conclusion assesses them more directly and, in the process, indicates what they suggest about the prospects for any future reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means that the United States faces near continuous threats from abroad. Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a revised framework, the American position in the world since has been one of permanent insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers. Although today these threats no longer come from menacing totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create a world of chaos and instability in which American domestic peace is imperiled by decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states. n310¶ [\*1486] ¶ Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modern threats makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes and likely consequences of existing dangers. Thus, the best response is the further entrenchment of the national security state, with the U.S. military permanently mobilized to gather intelligence and to combat enemies wherever they strike-at home or abroad. Accordingly, modern legal and political institutions that privilege executive authority and insulated decision-making are simply the necessary consequence of these externally generated crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an empowered presidency-one armed with countless secret and public agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint n311 -greatly outweigh the costs.¶ Yet although these sociological views have become commonplace, the conclusions that Americans should draw about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that such claims are not objective empirical judgments, but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not self-evident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims to security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides-and with it the issue of how democratic or insular our institutions should be-remains open as well.¶ Clearly, technological changes, from airpower to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America's position in the [\*1487] world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety. Yet in truth, they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers. n312 But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of these scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address them**.** Indeed, these latter security judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective political assessments-assessments that carry with them preexisting ideological points of view-such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy.¶ In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s, supporters of the modern security concept have-at times unwittingly-reaffirmed the political rather than purely objective nature of interpreting external threats. In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the idea of insecurity and America's post- World War II position of global primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. n313 In 1961, none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security imperatives meant that "our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century," was no longer "adequate" for the "20th-century nation." n314 For Fulbright, the driving impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional practices was the importance of sustaining the country's "pre-eminen[ce] in political and military power." n315 Fulbright believed that greater executive action and war- making capacities were essential precisely because the United States found itself "burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power." n316 According to Fulbright, the United States had [\*1488] both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that existed at the edges of American authority. n317 Thus, rather than being purely objective, the American condition of permanent danger was itself deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global primacy. What generated the condition of continual crisis was not only technological change, but also the belief that the United States' own national security rested on the successful projection of power into the internal affairs of foreign states.¶ The key point is that regardless of whether one agrees with such an underlying project, the value of this project is ultimately an open political question. This suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as generating insecurity at home is similarly as much an interpretative judgment as an empirically verifiable6 conclusion. n318 To appreciate the open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the presentation of terrorism as a principle and overriding danger facing the country. According to National Counterterrorism Center's 2009 Report on Terrorism, in 2009 there were just twenty-five U.S. noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide-nine abroad and sixteen at home. n319 While the fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, these numbers-which have been consistent in recent years-place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather than a condition of endemic danger-requiring ever-increasing secrecy and centralization-such facts are perfectly consistent with a reading that Americans do not face an existential crisis(one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources expended, especially in a time of profound economic insecurity, highlights the political choice of policymakers and citizens to persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War II and early Cold War lens of permanent threat. In fact, the continuous alteration of basic constitutional values to fit national security aims emphasizes just how entrenched Herring's old vision of security as pre-political and foundational has become, regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be equally compelling.¶ It also underscores a telling and often ignored point about the nature of [\*1489] modern security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States' massive intelligence infrastructure. To the extent that political assumptions-like the centrality of global primacy or the view that instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home-shape the interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as objective security expertise is itself intertwined with contested claims about how to view external actors and their motivations. These assumptions mean that while modern conditions may well be complex, the conclusions of the presumed experts may not be systematically less liable to subjective bias than judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It further underlines that the question of who decides cannot be foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to elite knowledge.¶ If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the basic failure of "expertise." n320 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threats to newspapers as a method of shaping the public debate. n321 These "open" secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making.

#### That causes a self-fulfilling prophecy based on false regimes of truth – that defines difference as threatening otherness.

**Jæger** 20**00** (Øyvind @ Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. *Peace and Conflict Studies* 7.2 “Securitizing Russia: Discoursive Practice of the Baltic States” shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf”, MT)

Security is a field of practice into which subject matters can be inserted as well as exempted. Security is a code for going about a particular business in very particular ways. By labeling an issue a security issue, that is, a threat to security, one legitimises the employment of extraordinary measures to counter the threat, because it threatens security. In other words, security is a self-referential practice that carries its own legitimisation and justification. Security issues are allotted priority above everything else because everything else is irrelevant if sovereignty is lost, the state loses independence and ceases to exist. This makes for the point that it is not security as an objective or a state of affairs that is the crux of understanding security, but rather the typical operations and modalities by which security comes into play, Wæver (1995) notes.15 The typical operations are speech-acts and the modality threat-defence sequences. That is, perceiving and conveying threats and calling upon defence hold back the alleged threat. This is also a self-referential practice with the dynamic of a security dilemma: Defensive measures taken with reference to a perceived threat cause increased sense of insecurity and new calls for defence, and so forth. Wæver’s argument is that this logic is at work also in other fields than those busying themselves with military defence of sovereignty. Moreover, viewing security as a speech act not only makes it possible to include different sectors in a study of security, and thus open up the concept. It also clears the way for resolving security concerns by desecuritising issues which through securitisation have raised the concern in the first place. Knowing the logic of securitisation and pinning it down when it is at work carries the possibility of reversing the process by advocating other modalities for dealing with a given issue unluckily cast as a matter of security. What is perceived as a threat and therefore invoking defence, triggering the spiral, might be perceived of otherwise, namely as a matter of political discord to be resolved by means of ordinary political conduct, (i.e. not by rallying in defence of sovereignty). A call for more security will not eliminate threats and dangers. It is a call for more insecurity as it will reproduce threats and perpetuate a security problem. As Wæver (1994:8)16 puts it:"Transcending a security problem, politicizing a problem can therefore not happen through thematization in terms of security, only away from it." That is what de-securitisation is about. David Campbell (1992) has taken the discursive approach to security one step further. He demonstrates that security is pretty much the business of (state) identity. His argument is developed from the claim that foreign policy is a discourse of danger that came to replace Christianity’s evangelism of fear in the wake of the Westphalian peace. But the effects of a "evangelism of fear" and a discourse of danger are similar – namely to produce a certitude of identity by depicting difference as otherness. As the Peace of Westphalia signified the replacement of church by state, faith by reason, religion by science, intuition by experience and tradition by modernity, the religious identity of salvation by othering evil ("think continually about death in order to avoid sin, because sin plus death will land you in hell"17 –so better beware of Jews, heretics, witches and temptations of the flesh) was replaced by a hidden ambiguity of the state. Since modernity’s privileging of reason erased the possibility of grounding social organisation in faith, it had to be propped up by reason and the sovereign state as a anthropomorphic representation of sovereign Man was offered as a resolution. But state identity cannot easily be produced by reason alone. The problem was, however, that once the "death of God" had been proclaimed, the link between the world, "man" and certitude had been broken (Campbell 1992: 53). Thus ambiguity prevailed in the modernist imperative that every presumption grounded in faith be revealed by reason, and on the other hand, that the privileging of modernity, the state, and reason itself is not possible without an element of faith. In Campbell’s (1992: 54) words: In this context of incipient ambiguity brought upon by an insistence that can no longer be grounded, securing identity in the form of the state requires an emphasis on the unfinished and endangered nature of the world. In other words, discourses of "danger" are central to the discourses of the "state" and the discourses of "man". In place of the spiritual certitude that provided the vertical intensity to support the horizontal extenciveness of Christendom, the state requires discourses of "danger" to provide a new theology of truth about who and what "we" are by highlighting who and what "we" are not, and what "we" have to fear. The mode through which the Campbellian discourse of danger is employed in foreign (and security) policy, can then be seen as practices of Wæverian securitisation. Securitisation is the mode of discourse and the discourse is a "discourse of danger" identifying and naming threats, thereby delineating Self from Other and thus making it clear what it is "we" are protecting, (i.e. what is "us", what is our identity and therefore – as representation – what is state identity). This is done by pointing out danger, threats and enemies, internal and external alike, and – by linking the two (Campbell 1992: 239): For the state, identity can be understood as the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the "inside" are linked through a discourse of danger (such as Foreign Policy) with threats identified and located on the "outside". To speak security is then to employ a discourse of danger inter-subjectively depicting that which is different from Self as an existential threat – and therefore as Other to Self. Securitisation is about the identity of that which is securitised on behalf of, a discursive practice to (re)produce the identity of the state. Securitising implies "othering" difference – making difference the Other in a binary opposition constituting Self (Neumann 1996b: 167). Turning to the Baltic Sea Region, one cannot help noting the rather loose fitting between the undeniable – indeed underscored – state focus in the works of both David Campbell and the Copenhagen School on the one hand, and the somewhat wishful speculations of regionality beyond the state – transcending sovereignty – on the other. Coupling the two is not necessarily an analytical problem. It only makes a rather weak case for regionality. But exactly that becomes a theoretical problem in undermining the very theoretical substance, and by implication – empirical viability – of regionality. There are of course indications that the role of states are relativised in late modern (or post- modern) politics. And there is reason to expect current developments in the security problematique of the Baltic states – firmly connected to the dynamic of NATO’s enlargement – to exert an impact on regional co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region, possibly even on regionality. NATO moving east, engaging Russia and carrying elements of the post-modernist security agenda with it in the process, is likely to narrow the gap between the two agendas. Moreover, since the Baltic states are not included in a first round of expansion, they might in this very fact (failure, some would say) find an incentive for shifting focus from international to regional levels. Involving Poland and engaging Russia, the enlargement of NATO will in fact bring the Alliance as such (not only individual NATO countries as the case has been) to bear increasingly on the regional setting as well as on regional activity. That might add significance to the regional level. It does not, however, necessarily imply that the state as actor and state centric approaches will succumb to regionality. Neither does it do away with the state as the prime referent for, and producer of, collective identity, so central to the approaches of both Wæver and Campbell. But it might spur a parallel to sovereignty. A way out of this theoretical impasse would then be not to stress the either or of regionality/sovereignty, but to see the two as organising principles at work side by side, complementing each other in parallelity rather than excluding one another in contrariety. The Discourse of Danger: The Russian war on Chechnya is one event that was widely interpreted in the Baltic as a ominous sign of what Russia has in store for the Baltic states (see Rebas 1996: 27; Nekrasas 1996: 58; Tarand 1996: 24; cf. Haab 1997). The constitutional ban in all three states on any kind of association with post-Soviet political structures is indicative of a threat perception that confuses Soviet and post- Soviet, conflating Russia with the USSR and casting everything Russian as a threat through what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) call a discursive "chain of equivalence". In this the value of one side in a binary opposition is reiterated in other denotations of the same binary opposition. Thus, the value "Russia" in a Russia/Europe-opposition is also denoted by "instability", "Asia", "invasion", "chaos", "incitement of ethnic minorities", "unpredictability", "imperialism", "slander campaign", "migration", and so forth. The opposite value of these markers ("stability", "Europe", "defence", "order", and so on) would then denote the Self and thus conjure up an identity. When identity is precarious, this discursive practice intensifies by shifting onto a security mode, treating the oppositions as if they were questions of political existence, sovereignty, and survival. Identity is (re)produced more effectively when the oppositions are employed in a discourse of in-security and danger, that is, made into questions of national security and thus securitised in the Wæverian sense. In the Baltic cases, especially the Lithuanian National Security Concept is knitting a chain of equivalence in a ferocious discourse of danger. Not only does it establish "[t]hat the defence of Lithuania is total and unconditional," and that "[s]hould there be no higher command, self-controlled combat actions of armed units and citizens shall be considered legal." (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 1, 2) It also posits that [t]he power of civic resistance is constituted of the Nation’s Will and self-determination to fight for own freedom, of everyone citizen’s resolution to resist to [an] assailant or invader by all possible ways, despite citizen’s age and [or] profession, of taking part in Lithuania’s defence (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 4). When this is added to the identifying of the objects of national security as "human and citizen rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; state sovereignty; rights of the nation, prerequisites for a free development; the state independence; the constitutional order; state territory and its integrity, and; cultural heritage," and the subjects as "the state, the armed forces and other institutions thereof; the citizens and their associations, and; non governmental organisations,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 2, Sc. 1, 2) one approaches a conception of security in which the distinction between state and nation has disappeared in all-encompassing securitisation. Everyone is expected to defend everything with every possible means.

#### The alt is to interrogate the epistemological failures of the 1ac --- this is a prereq to successful policy.

**Ahmed 12** Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis

While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad. The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question. As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves. There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them. Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

## Russia

The risk of Russia miscalc as very low and concedes their model is flawed

Barrett et. Al. 13 [Anthony M., Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Seth D. Baum- Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University, Kelly R. Hostetler- Department of Geography, Pennsylvania State University, 2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia”, <http://sethbaum.com/ac/fc_NuclearWar.pdf>, ALB]

Given that no nuclear war between the United States and the USSR or Russia has¶ occurred in the last four decades, relatively low war probability predictions seem intuitively¶ more likely than relatively high war probability predictions. Statistical significance tests may¶ provide a more quantitative check of the sensibility of the estimates of the model. For example,¶ with the use of a binomial distribution to find the confidence interval for an event probability p,¶ given that zero such events has yet occurred in n independent random trials, p lies within the¶ interval [0, u] with (1 – α) confidence, where gives the upper limit of the confidence¶ interval.69 If using α = 0.05 to find u as the upper limit of a 95 percent confidence interval, and¶ given n = 37 independent trials (i.e. each year from 1975 to 2012) without an event occurring,¶ then u = 0.08. In other words, given that there has been no inadvertent nuclear war between the¶ United States and Russia during the 37-year period for which this paper assumes its modeled¶ systems and response procedures have been in place, there could be a statistical argument for**¶** rejecting (with 95 percent confidence) a probabilistic model that produced a best estimate (i.e. a¶ mean value) for annual nuclear war probability above 0.08. Because the model used in this paper¶ produce best estimates of annual probability of inadvertent U.S.-Russia war that are well below¶ 0.08, this statistical test does not suggest rejecting the model’s estimates with 95 percent¶ confidence. However, many readers may intuitively feel that even an annual nuclear war**¶** probability of eight percent seems too high to be useful discriminator of the model’s validity. In¶ any case, it could be more productive to check or revise specific assumptions or parameters**¶** within the model, such as with additional data on rates and probabilities of false-alarm events,**¶** when new information becomes available. It could also be useful to use additional empirical data¶ to check assumptions of the model that were based primarily on mathematical-modeling¶ reasoning rather than on empirical data, because of the limited amounts of empirical data¶ available. One example is the assumption in Equation 4 that MDC false alarm resolution times¶ are exponentially distributed.

## Spills

#### The fundamental question of this debate is what narrative strategies are most likely to generate effective social movements --- environmental catastrophe rhetoric prevents action and ensures extinction by foreclosing individual agency and justifying xenophobia.

**Yuen et. Al. ‘12** - Sasha Lilley, David McNally, Eddie Yuen “Catastrophism: The Apocalyptic Politics of Collapse and Rebirth, Oct 5, 2012, google books, pg 15-21)//a-berg, Modified for ablist language

The spectre of apocalypse haunts the world today. Every political, cultural, and aesthetic field that we look at is replete with talk of catastrophe. This poses a particular challenge for environ mentalists and scientists who are tasked with raising awareness about what is unquestionably a genuinely catastrophic moment in human and planetary history. Of all of the forms of catastrophic discourse on offer, the collapse of ecological systems is unique in that it is definitively verified by a consensus within the scientific community. The growing body of evidence is alarming. In addition to the well-known crisis of climate change, leading scientists have listed eight other planetary boundaries that must not be crossed if the earth is to remain habitable for humans and many other species.’ These interrelated calamities include ocean acidification, the disruption of the nitrogen cycle, and the sixth mass extinction in planetary history, all of which are truly apocalyptic.2 It is absolutely urgent to address this by effectively and rapidly changing the direction of human society. Unfortunately, discussion of this crisis and how to tackle it is often dominated by an undifferentiated catastrophist discourse that presumes apocalyptic warnings will lead to political action and hinders rather than helps the efforts of activists, scholars, scientists, and concerned people in general in bringing about the dramatic changes required. In a world system saturated with instrumental. spurious, and sometimes maniacal versions of catastrophism—including right wing racial paranoia, religious millenarianism,’ liberal panics over fascism, leftist fetishization of capitalist collapse, capitalist invocation of the “shock doctrine,” and pop culture cliché—what is the best way to articulate the all-too-real evidence for accelerating environmental catastrophe?4 Is there, in fact, an inherently liberatory or radical politics that stems from a recognition of ecological catastrophe? If there is not, what effects do catastrophist rhetorics have on radical environmental movement building? As this essay will argue. even when dire environmental prognostications are accurate—and the evidence is overwhelmingly clear that they are—it is often the case that knowledge of “the facts” does not lead to an increase in political engagement. Given how high the stakes are, it is vitally important that environmental and climate movements understand the problems with catastrophism. The foundational problematic of this book is the question of politicization: what narrative strategies are most likely to generate effective and radical social movements? This essay will examine the main reasons that environmental catastrophism has not led to more dynamic social movements: these include catastrophe fatigue, the ~~paralyzing~~ effects of fear, the pairing of overwhelmingly bleak analysis with inadequate solutions, and a misunderstanding of the process of politicization. It will also explore capitalism’s relationship to catastrophe and how the effects of environmental crises differ in their impact depending on place, race, gender. and class. The chapter exam-ines how the long history of Malthusianism and previous false prophecies—doomsday predictions that did not come true—have shaped the current discourse. It explores the ways in which catastrophism may serve the interests of corporations. It concludes that unless some differentiation is made between antagonistic human communities, classes, and interests, environmental catastrophism may end up exacerbating the very problems to which it seeks to call attention. We must start this inquiry by understanding that the veracity of apocalyptic claims about ecological collapse are separate from their effects on social, political, and economic life. One recent study found that, for many Americans, the more that is known about global warming, the less “personal responsibility” people feel for acting upon the crisis.5 After surveying nearly 1,1oo people, the authors state that “more informed respondents both feel less personally responsible for global warming, and also show less concern for global warming.” They conclude that, “high levels of confidence in scientists among Americans led to a decreased sense of responsibility for global warming.” Unfortunately, this evidence shows that once convinced of apocalyptic scenarios, many Americans become more apathetic. These studies illuminate basic political problems with the catastrophist rhetoric of the scientific and environmental communities. Why might their doomsday messages not be generating the desired results? This chapter is organized around several responses to this question. Normalization of Catastrophe Western discourses regarding the relation to nature have frequently swung on a pendulum between cornucopian optimism and triumphalism on one pole and unrelieved pessimism not only of our powers to escape from the clutches of naturally imposed limits but even to be autonomous beings outside of nature-driven necessities at the other pole. ... There is. . . nothing more ideologically powerful for capitalist interests to have at hand than unconstrained technological optimism and doctrines of progress ineluctably coupled to a doom-saying Malthusianism that can conveniently be blamed when, as inevitably they do, things go wrong. David Harvey A common starting point for environmental catastrophism is that capitalist modernity is the best of all possible worlds, but is currently facing some exceptional problems. In this view, once these potentially disastrous problems are recognized, a combination of scientific innovation and popular belt-tightening should make possible a new period of growth without any fundamental changes.7 Rather than seeing the various ecological crises con verging now as exceptional, we must understand them as part of an inherently catastrophic mode of producing and reproducing social lift. We must not take for granted the grinding, quotidian catastrophe of capitalism during the times when we are faced with exceptional calamities. This is especially true in our under standing of ecology, which has been profoundly shaped by the last five centuries of enclosure and commodification, a process that has accelerated in recent years. Another pole of environmental catastrophism is that the cur rent crisis is endemic to “civilization,” or human nature itself. In some iterations, this also means that there is no differentiation between types of civilization, modes of production, culture, or technology. In some of these perspectives, all human activity is equally destructive, whether the mass extinctions caused to the “new lands” of Oceania and the Americas by Polynesians and Paleo-Indian or the current corporate ransacking of the planet by Chevron, Freeport-McMoRan, and RTZ. This deeply pessimistic “primitivist” catastrophism places the problem too far upstream to speak meaningfully to the current crisis. The paradox of today’s environmental crisis is that it is so tragically preventable: the great majority of capitalist production and consumption is patently unnecessary. In the absence of a critique of the specific political and economic system in which the current ecological crisis is situated, the only solutions on offer will be moralistic and technocratic.° Worse still, there is a real danger that right-wing and nationalist solutions to the environmental crisis will become increasingly appealing. For these reasons, the stakes of accurately understanding the relationship between ecological and capitalist crisis could not be higher. In her classic 1993 polemic against “apocalyptic environmentalism,” geographer Cindi Katz argued that a politics of fear is rooted in the basic dichotomy of devastation or salvation, and ultimately breeds hopelessness. Overly generalized discussions of ecological collapse, for all their ostensible good intentions, tend to foreclose agency by functioning as a “totalizing narrative to end all totalizing narratives.”10 Historicizing the crisis does not diminish it. As Katz argues “contemporary problems are so serious that rendering them apocalyptic obscures their political ecology—their sources, their political, economic and social dimensions.” Again, the issue is not the veracity of the science, but rather the larger politics within which the science is couched. When we analyze the prevailing discourses on ecological col lapse from an anticapitalist perspective, we better understand why many attempts at mass organizing have heretofore fallen flat. By pairing catastrophic information with glaringly inadequate solutions, the (majority of) scientific and environmental communities have offered little to inspire mobilization. Popular environmental films such as An inconvenient Truth follow compelling evidence for ecological collapse with woefully inadequate injunctions to green consumption or lobbying of political representatives. The underlying message is that the only available form of political agency lies in being an individual consumer within the market place. For the same reason that a near plurality of Americans does not vote, ordinary people don’t see “consuming virtuously” as a plausible solution. After all, why buy more expensive toilet paper or spend hours of unpaid labor separating trash when 1W went back to making profits with oil drilling in the Gulf of Mexico not long after the Deep Water Horizon disaster? At best, such individualized response to the environmental crisis leads to existential, expressive, and voluntarist politics. A more common outcome, however, seems to be acute disempowerment and disengagement with environmental politics altogether. It is no wonder that the fear-based appeals to catastrophism favored by many environmentalists and scientists have not had the desired effects. None of this critique is meant to disparage the remarkable work done by many environmental organizations. networks, and activists over the last few decades on issues ranging from antimining and anti-dam campaigns, conservation biology and bio diversity protection of old growth and contiguous eco-systems, struggles to regulate and ultimately abolish toxic, nuclear and fossil fuel production, and many other issues. Were it not for this work, there would truly be no hope, and it is worth mentioning that environmental and climate justice perspectives are steadily gaining traction in internal environmental debates. The Apocalypse Has Already Been Televised It is a paradox of the twenty-first century that just as the con tours of multipronged environmental crisis are coming into sharp focus, the world, and especially the United States, may be suffering from “catastrophe fatigue.” Apocalyptic imagery has saturated popular culture for decades, but came to a boil with the “rapture’ of 2011, the apocryphal ‘Mayan prophecy of 2012. racist anxiety over the erosion of white majorities in the Global North, theocratic panic over the changing gender order, the ongoing financial meltdown, and the endless stream of “end-times” movies and video games.” The ubiquity of apocalypse in recent decades has led to a banalization of the concept—it is seen as normal, expected, in a sense comfortable. When a crisis does occur, people immediately reference it to movies, and there are now CCI images that serve as reference points for any conceivable disaster. Environmentalists and scientists must compete in this marketplace of catastrophe, and find themselves struggling to be heard above the din. In this crowded field, increased awareness of environmental crisis will not likely translate into a more ecological lifestyle, let alone an activist orientation against the root causes of environmental degradation. In fact, right-wing and nationalist environmental politics have much more to gain from an embrace of catastrophism. This is especially true if the invocation of fear is the primary rhetorical device. Fear, as Rainer Werner Fassbinder pointed out, can “cat the soul.” Fear is not a stable place to organize a radical politics, but it can be a very effective platform from which to launch a campaign of populist xenophobia or authoritarian technocracy under the sign of scarcity. Needless to say, fear is a logical and probably inevitable response to any person fully realizing the dire condition of the planet and its eco-systems right now. Emerging social movements will have to address this fear through a range of creative, directly democratic, and collective projects. This project is urgent, as environmental fears can be easily manipulated by capital and the state. Naomi Klein has famously described how the threat of economic disaster is a pre requisite for the “Shock Doctrine,” and it is not hard to envision environmental correlates of this. An undifferentiated narrative of environmental doom is disempowering and encourages feelings of helplessness.

**Empirically denied and alternate causality – hundreds of thousands of species die annually**

**Paltrowitz, 01** (JD Brooklyn Journal of I-Law, 2001 (A Greening of the World Trade Organisation”)

However, the panel did not take into account the practical reality that negotiations are time-consuming. The environment, animal life and human life can all be irreparably harmed as time passes. n105 For instance, one scholar has reported [\*1807] that "the world is losing between 27,000 and 150,000 species per year, approximately seventy-four species every day, and three every hour and up to seventy percent of the world's fisheries are depleted or under stress after years of over-exploitation." n106 This concern is especially pertinent in the case of the eastern spinner dolphin and coastal spotted dolphin, which are on the endangered species list. n107 Yet, even for the dolphin species that are not endangered, a similar concern applies because if dolphins continue to be maimed or killed in tuna purse seines then their numbers could become seriously depleted to the point where they may be put on the endangered species list. In short, Tuna-Dolphin I shows the preeminence of trade values at the expense of environmental values. Therefore, the panel's acknowledgment of the WTO's Preamble rang hollow when it stated: " . . . that the provisions of the GATT impose few constraints on a contracting party's implementation of domestic environmental policies." n108

#### The plan ensures a rush toward expansive drilling—purely exploratory now – causes spills

Claver-Carone, 08 – director of the US-Cuba Democracy PAC (Mauricio, “How the Cuban embargo protects the environment,” *The New York Times*, July 25, Online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/25/opinion/25iht-edcarone.1.14793496.html>)//VP

For almost a decade now, the Castro regime has been lauding offshore lease agreements. It has tried Norway's StatoilHydro, India's state-run Oil & Natural Gas Corporation, Malaysia's Petronas and Canada's Sherritt International. Yet, there is no current drilling activity off Cuba's coasts. The Cuban government has announced plans to drill, then followed with postponements in 2006, 2007 and this year. Clearly, foreign oil companies anticipate political changes in Cuba and are trying to position themselves accordingly. It is equally clear they are encountering legal and logistical obstacles preventing oil and gas exploration and development. Among the impediments are well-founded reservations as to how any new discovery can be turned into product. Cuba has very limited refining capacity, and the U.S. embargo prevents sending Cuban crude oil to American refineries. Neither is it financially or logistically viable for partners of the current Cuban regime to undertake deep-water exploration without access to U.S. technology, which the embargo prohibits transferring to Cuba. The prohibitions exist for good reason. Fidel Castro expropriated U.S. oil company assets after taking control of Cuba and has never provided compensation. Equally important, foreign companies trying to do business with Cuba still face a lot of expenses and political risks. If, or when, the Cuban regime decides again to expropriate the assets of these companies, there is no legal recourse in Cuba.

## Cooperation

#### No warming extinction

**Carter et. Al 11–** Robert, PhD, Adjuct Research Fellow, James Cook University, Craig Idso, PhD, Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Fred Singer, PhD, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Susan Crockford, evolutionary biologist with a specialty in skeletal taxonomy , paleozoology and vertebrate evolution, Joseph D’Aleo, 30 years of experience in professional meteorology, former college professor of Meteorology at Lyndon State College, Indur Goklany, independent scholar, author, and co-editor of the Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Sherwood Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Research Physicist with the US Department of Agriculture, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Botany, and Microbiology at Arizona State University, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy, all from the University of Minnesota, Madhav Khandekar, former research scientist from Environment Canada and is an expert reviewer for the IPCC 2007 Climate Change Panel, Anthony Lupo, Department Chair and Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Missouri, Willie Soon, astrophysicist at the Solar and Stellar Physics Division of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Mitch Taylor (Canada) (March 8th, “[Surviving](file:///C%3A%5CMarc%5CDesktop%5CSurviving) the Unpreceented Climate Change of the IPCC” <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html>) Jacome

On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos *et al*., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis *et al*. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate.

#### No terrorist threat – treating terrorism as a threat is racist, profiling, and causes a self-fulfilling prophecy

**Zulaika, 10** (Joseba, Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada, “The terror/counterterror edge: when non-terror becomes a terrorism problem and real terror cannot be detected by counterterrorism,” Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2010, pg. 247-260, Taylor and Francis, pdf­)

In fact, between 1974 and 1994, two decades in which terrorism loomed as the greatest threat to American security, more people died in the United States of bee stings; and John Mueller has shown the extent to which the dangers of terrorism have been ‘overblown’ (Mueller 2006). Consider the four years 1989–1992 to realise the magnitude of the non-Terror problem afflicting the United States. These were the years in which communism as the historic enemy of the West disappeared and terrorism was called to substitute for it. And yet, contrary to Brian Jenkins’s prediction that by the end of the 1980s terrorism incidents might double, during those four years there was not a single fatality from terrorism in the United States. During those same years there were approximately 100,000 reported ‘normal’ deaths. In the same period over 1500 books on terrorism were published. It is not a joke to say that the real problem for this entire terrorism industry was the very absence of terrorism. The very logic of ‘anomaly’ requires that some exceptional event takes place, so that at last one ‘terrorist’ death will make a thousand other deaths ‘ordinary’. But if the ratio is, as it was during those four years, 100,000 versus zero, then the very non-existence of the anomalous puts in question the normality/abnormality polarity and deprives the entire terrorism discourse of its basic frame. What do you do in such situations? If there is no problem but there is supposed to be one, consciously or unconsciously you end up helping create one. This is the very definition of the self-fulfilling prophecy. As sociologist Robert Merton puts it: The self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the original false conception come true. This specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of terror. For the prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was right from the very beginning . . . such are the perversities of social logic. (Merton 1968, p. 477) It was false that al-Qaeda was in Iraq before March 2003 (the excuse to go to war) but it is true that there is al-Qaeda in Iraq now – which serves as a justification to continue the war. It was false that there was a minaret problem in Switzerland (the excuse for an antiMuslim referendum) but it is true that there is a minaret problem in Switzerland now. A similar affliction appears to be taking over in other regions of the European Union. Countries such as Finland, as an example, are so peripheral to the hot spots of the current international politics that there has never been a terrorist act, let alone a terrorist organisation, in their soil. When Terror is the tabooed coin of political centrality, a country with no Terror problem appears to be a second-class power deprived of symbolic capital. Such non-existence borders on the anomalous. It is no surprise therefore that Finland, under obligation from the European Union and international treaties, has decided to enact antiterrorist legislation. It is one thing not to be a nuclear power, a prerogative that requires enormous economic and political might, and which is the ultimate symbol of military power; but in the absence of nuclear power, what else but involvement in counterterrorism (always symbiotically related to nuclearism in the current world) holds enough symbolic capital as to guarantee that a country is not totally irrelevant in current world affairs? So, even if there is no threat of terrorism and this is the last thing the authorities want to plague their country, the dynamics of international politics subject to the ‘War on Terror’ and the omnipresence of the apocalyptic messages of terror spread by the media make it inevitable the development of a tough counterterrorist legislation (with the likelihood that previously non-terrorist acts will now be categorised as ‘terrorist’) and the involvement in a dominant public discourse in which everyone is affected by the threat from terrorism. It appears to be partly a case of terrorism envy. I remember Basque friends of mine being affected by this malady in their youths: anyone worth his salt should have been in ETA during the anti-Francoist resistance of the 1960s and early 1970s. If you were not, you suffered from a clear case of symbolic castration. Involvement in ETA was the way to show that you had what it took. And in order to be considered by ETA a worthy candidate, you had to do something daring, such as putting at risk the life of an alleged police informer by provoking a car accident, hoping in the meantime that this would be rewarded with membership in the group. When ETA had all the symbolic capital of heroic resistance, you felt guilty for not participating in its violent activity and envious of those who enjoyed its mystique. Something similar seems to take place with nations regarding international terrorism. Was not the good luck of Prime Minister Jose María Aznar that he had a puny domestic terrorist group, killing a town councilman or a journalist once in a while, against which he could involve his entire nation; and as a reward for which he could suddenly turn Spain, after centuries of political and military irrelevance on the world stage, and as illustrated by the photograph of the Azores before the Iraqi war, into a power player on the international scene in the company of President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair? Which second- or third-rate country would not feel political envy when seeing such influence in exchange for three or four terrorist fatalities a year? Playing terrorist Begona Aretxaga views the response of the Spanish state terror to ETA’s terrorism as the result of mimetic terrorist desire, namely, ‘an organized mimesis of terrorism as the constituting force of the state as subject’ (Aretxaga 2005, p. 223). In essence, in order to vanquish Basque terrorism, state officials became terrorists and organised a state terrorist organisation by the name of Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacíon (GAL, Antiterrorist Liberation Groups). Aretxaga shows how the Spanish agents’ involvement in the killing of Basque refugees reads like: a parody of stock representations of Basque terrorists. It imitates the landscape and actions associated with ETA in cinema, fiction, and the media. . . . What is produced in this mimetic engagement of the state with the representation of terrorism is, precisely, terror: a traumatic read of dead bodies and intense affects – exhilaration, anger, and fear. And not only terror, but the state itself as subject, is produced in the act of producing terror – a restless state subject characterized by uncontrolled excitement. (Aretxaga 2005, pp. 223–224) One of the kidnappings by the Spanish officials was that of a French citizen by the name of Segundo Marey; soon they found out that he had no connection with ETA at all; still, instead of admitting the mistake and letting the man free, the Chief of Police consulted with the Civil Governor and the Head of Intelligence and decided to keep Marey kidnapped in order to exploit him politically against the French state. They issued a communiqué asking the French authorities to release two Spanish policemen detained in France for an attempted kidnapping or Marey would be killed. There was talk among the officers about killing the man, but luckily France released the Spanish policemen and Marey was also freed. This was a clear case in which state officials were ‘playing terrorist’ (they even decided to organise an extortion system similar to ETA’s that involved kidnapping French industrialists and levying a ‘revolutionary tax’). In the process, they ‘got carried away by the excitement of transgression and the sensation of omnipotence it brings’ (Aretxaga 2005, p. 221). By then, Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez had famously justified the state’s counterterrorist dirty war as the need for ‘the sewers of the State’. The state terror went on for four years and resulted in the killings of 27 refugees. It is a case of terrorism envy in which what counts for state officials is not the legality of freeing an innocent man, but instead, observes Aretxaga (2005): what matters is the power emanating from mimetic action, the enactment of the desire to be a terrorist. It is the act of kidnapping, killing, extorting that makes terrorism – like the state – real and effective, by binding its actors to and in an imaginary relation that constitutes an alternative reality. On the stage of the state being, fantasy cannot be separated from the calculated objectives that originally triggered the actions of terror. Indeed, it is through the enactment of fantasy in mimetic performance that terror becomes real and the state powerful. (p. 224) Could not we say similar things about the open adoption of torture by Bush’s administration? If terrorists can kidnap, torture and kill, then why not our powerful state? Regardless of the well-recognised fact that it does not bring forth reliable truth, torture is the ultimate transgressive act of power. Mirror images inside terrorists: from McVeigh to Major Hasan What about the terrorism envy of those who, according to media representations, became paradigmatic ‘terrorists’ such as the Unabomber, Timothy McVeigh, or most recently Major Nidal Hasan? In the case of Basque friends of mine who suffered ETA envy, it was an armed organisation that had to recruit them after weighing up whether they were suitable material for an underground organisation; I know of several who were rejected despite their ‘actions’ to prove their worth. But in the current media frenzy, anyone can instantly become a ‘terrorist’ regardless of being part of an armed group or having a stated strategy. This is the case of McVeigh whose acts did not fit any classical definition of an armed terrorism group engaged in psychological terror with a political agenda. What is remarkable about McVeigh is the self-fulfilling nature of his terrorist career, because the basic references of his plot were provided by counterterrorism discourse: his shooting practice targets while a soldier were ‘terrorists’; his action plan was scripted by William Luther Pierce’s (under the pseudonym Andrew Macdonald) right-wing The Turner Diaries (1978) (itself inspired by the anonymous apocalyptic novel The John Franklin Letters (1959) in which America falls under a global Soviet conspiracy); his alias was ‘T. Tutle’, the name of the superterrorist hero in the Hollywood film Brazil (1985); and the day chosen for the bombing was 19 April, the second anniversary of the Waco tragedy, a cause célèbre for militias angered by the government’s violent response to the apocalyptic Branch Davidians. So the question is: after his rejection by the army, where he wanted to serve as a marine, to what extent was a dejected McVeigh’s desire for violent action prompted out of spite and following the very counterterrorism agenda he had pursued earlier in his army career? In McVeigh’s subjectivity the terrorist and the marine soldier had an imaginary relationship in which they constituted each other as in a Lacanian ‘mirror image’. What makes a soldier a soldier in counterterrorist warfare is his deadly opposition to the figure of the terrorist; similarly, even if ordinarily the aspiration of the terrorists is not to fight soldiers, in an allout war in which the enemy is defined as ‘terrorist’, what makes him or her a terrorist is the determination to fight the soldier to the end. McVeigh felt the power by which his own self could experience both sides of his divided self, the soldier and the terrorist, by switching from one side of the imaginary mirror to the other; and his omnipotence consisted in demonstrating to the American public that he was the subject who could be the edge bringing both irreconcilable sides of the mirror together. Since he was not allowed to be the marine counterterrorist hero, he could instead be its arch-enemy by enviously appropriating for himself the power of the tabooed Terrorist. And what about Major Hasan and the Fort Hood massacre? Was it a case of insanity or terrorism? He seems to be a Muslim fanatic, connected to other Muslim fanatics. Is he a terrorist? Does he have an organisation behind him ready to use terror to further a political agenda? Or is he someone who, in a case of terrorism envy, translated his psychotic confusion, pushing him over the edge into the fantasy of becoming a ‘martyr’ for his Muslim brothers? He must have seen himself in the mirror of his split American and Muslim personae. Should he be on the side of his own American army killing Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan, or should he be squarely on the side of the Muslims and therefore against his own army? When he could no longer harbour inside the split between both phantasmatic realities constituting each other, he decided to overcome the unbearable by turning himself into a martyr in the name of Allah. As Robert Wright wrote in an op-ed piece: The Fort Hood shooting, then, is an example of Islamist terrorism being spread partly by the war on terrorism – or, actually, by two wars on terrorism, in Iraq and Afghanistan. And Fort Hood is the biggest data point we have – the most lethal Islamist terrorist attack on American soil since 9/11. It’s only one piece of evidence, but it’s a salient piece, and it supports the liberal, not the conservative, war-on-terrorism paradigm. (Wright 2009, p. W11) Conservatives may argue that we cannot allow people like Hasan veto power over our foreign policy, but the reality is that alienated, vulnerable people like him are likely to end up going over the edge because of the hawkish anti-jihad War on Terror that led to disasters such as the Iraq war. Is such a never-ending war necessary when, in the era of the Internet, terrorist acts can be orchestrated from anywhere, including a US military barracks such as Fort Hood? In Wright’s opinion, ‘the case of Nidal Hasan shows one thing for sure: Homegrown American terrorists don’t need a safe haven. All they need is a place to buy a gun’ (Wright 2009, p. W11). Still, Hasan is, out of the millions of American Muslims, the only one to have committed such a horrific massacre in the eight years since 9/11, which shows that Muslims are not intrinsically any more violent than Christians. But when, in the era of the Internet and video technology, you have instances such as minaret bans in Switzerland and denigration of Muslims in the workplace, the likelihood of vulnerable people going overboard increases dangerously. There was also the case of Carlos Bledsoe, converted to Islam as a teenager, who fatally shot a soldier in Little Rock who, upon being arrested, told the police about Muslims being killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. To what extent is all of this a case of self-fulfilling prophecy? On 4 December 2009, at New York’s Binghamton University, a Saudi Arabian student stabbed to death an emeritus 77-year-old professor who had been a member of his dissertation committee. One of the student’s roommates declared that, before the murder, the Muslim graduate student ‘was acting oddly, like a terrorist’ (Schmidt and Regan 2009, p. A23). Is there now any way in which the actions of a Muslim who goes mad in the United States would not be translated into ‘terrorism?’ And then, on 11 December 2009, there were reports that five young Muslim Americans from the suburbs of Washington had been arrested in Pakistan on their way to Taliban territory. The men’s intention was apparently to fight American troops in Afghanistan; reportedly, they had been recruited by a Pakistani militant through an Internet chat room: It was unclear on Thursday how serious a threat the group presented, or whether these young men had broken any laws in Pakistan of the United States. At least two of the men were being questioned in F.B.I. custody in Pakistan, and all of them would probably be deported, a senior administration official in Washington said. Whether the men acted on a lark or were recruited as part of a larger militant outfit, the case has renewed concerns that American citizens, some with ethnic ties to Pakistan and other Muslim countries, are increasingly at the centre of terrorist plots against the United States and other nations. (Giliani and Perlez, 2009, p. A20) Below the report there was another piece about the suspected men being praised by their neighbours as ‘intensely devout “good guys”’ (Lorber and Southhall 2009, p. A20). If they had been recruited by ‘a militant with links to al Qaeda’, once in Pakistan the five men were stranded. They tried to join ‘an extremist Islamic school’ near Karachi and an ‘extremist organisation’, but were ‘rebuffed in both places because of their Western demeanor and their inability to speak the national language, Urdu’. The five men had been arrested at a home in a government housing complex that belonged to an uncle of the eldest of the group. The picture of five American citizens recruited allegedly by al-Qaeda through the Internet and unable to join an extremist group once in Pakistan does not underscore a very efficient terrorist organisation; still, the journalists wondered ‘whether the men had been recruited to a specific militant or terrorist organization’ and mentioned the possibility of ties to banned groups such as Jaish-e-Muhammad and Jamaat-ud-Dawa. What the report did not disclose was the mystery of who the Pakistani close to al-Qaeda was who recruited them with promises of taking them ‘to Afghanistan to fight jihad’, and who ‘booked them in a hotel in Lahore’, but ‘once they got there, their contact went to ground and they were stranded’. In the end, were the five Muslim Americans caught in the ‘mirror image’ inside their split identities, by which their religious self and their civic citizenship are constituted in irreconcilable mutual antagonism? Such a mirror split, needless to say, is linked directly to the policies and mind-set of the War on Terror turned into the self-fulfilling soil in which Muslim Americans are pushed towards the edge. A week after the news of the five young men caught in Pakistan broke, another report delineated the larger contexts of Muslim anger in the United States and a clear picture, once again, of how counterterrorism may become terrorism’s best ally.

# 2NC

## Security

#### Critical praxis outweighs policy making --- voting affirmative guarantees error replication. Only a radical break from dominant paradigms can avoid a self-fulfilling prophecy

Cheeseman & Bruce 1996 (Graeme, Senior Lecturer at the University of New South Wales, and Robert, Associate Professor in social sciences at Curtin university, “Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers”, p. 5-8, MT)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated.¶ This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15¶ The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democraticdialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power.¶ In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security.¶ This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years.¶ There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. Firstcomes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, thenspecific policies may follow.¶ As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

And, you are not a policy-maker—pretending you are causes absolving of individual responsibility—ensures the aff’s impacts are inevitable and link turns their cede the political arguments.

Kappeler 1995 (Susanne, Associate Professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Al Akhawayn University, “The Will to Violence”, p. 10-11, MT)

We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equival ent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phe nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' our readiness, in other words, to build ident ities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence. “destining” of revealing insofar as it “pushes” us in a certain direction. Heidegger does not regard destining as determination (he says it is not a “fate which compels”), but rather as the implicit project within the field of modern practices to subject all aspects of reality to the principles of order and efficiency, and to pursue reality down to the finest detail. Thus, insofar as modern technology aims to order and render calculable, the objectification of reality tends to take the form of an increasing classification, differentiation, and fragmentation of reality. The possibilities for how things appear are increasingly reduced to those that enhance calculative activities.  Heidegger perceives the real danger in the modern age to be that human beings will continue to regard technology as a mere instrument and fail to inquire into its essence. He fears that all revealing will become calculative and all relations technical, that the unthought horizon of revealing, namely the “concealed” background practices that make technological thinking possible, will be forgotten. He remarks:  The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. *(QT,* 33) [10](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194)  Therefore, it is not technology, or science, but rather the essence of technology as a way of revealing that constitutes the danger; for the essence of technology is existential*,* not technological. [11](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194) It is a matter of how human beings are fundamentally oriented toward their world vis a vis their practices, skills, habits, customs, and so forth. Humanism contributes to this danger insofar as it fosters the illusion that technology is the result of a collective human choice and therefore subject to human control. [12](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194)

#### Co-option DA - Orthodox security studies remains a firm hegemony, alternatives that do not challenge disciplinary norms by utilizing the rhetoric of security causes co-option and kills future potential alternatives.

Jones 1999 (Richard Wyn is Dr Richard Wyn Jones becomes the Director of the University’s Wales Governance Centre – a key centre for knowledge and research on governance, devolution and constitutional affairs.Derek Jones, Cardiff University’s Director of Business and Strategic Partnerships, formerly the Senior Director of the Welsh Assembly Government. “Security, Strategy and Critical Theory” pg. 145-147. 1999. Questia, MT)

If this analysis of the conceptualization of the theory-practice nexus in the work of critical theorists is correct, then it is clear that this aspect of their work can be of little relevance to proponents of critical security studies. And yet these proponents are faced with the issue of the nature of the relationship between critical theory and emancipatory politics in a particularly acute way. The provision of national security is still the primary raison d'être of the sovereign state, and as such, it remains the state's most jealously guarded preserve. As a result, any attempt to create an alternative discourse in the field of security–and in particular any attempt to problematize the role of the state as the provider of security–is likely to be strongly resisted. This resistance was clearly seen in the United Kingdom in the early 1980s when the state made determined efforts to combat the peace movement and marginalize those who were perceived as its supporters in academia. Witness, for example, the Thatcher-inspired demonization of peace studies at the University of Bradford, an unedifying but instructive episode that has been discussed by the former head of the department, James O'Connell (*The Guardian,* October 16, 1993; *The Times,* October 25, 1993). Two further problems arise from the mutual implication of traditional security discourse and statism. First, as Simon Dalby points out, security as it is traditionally conceived “is inherently politically conservative precisely because it emphasizes permanence, control, and predictability” (Dalby 1992: 98). This means that any alternative account that arises from within the discipline (or, more correctly, subdiscipline) must challenge disciplinary norms–its common sense–in a most profound way. As Carol Cohn illustrates, even the language of traditional security studies militates against any attempt to present alternative accounts of reality or alternative possibilities for the future (Cohn 1987). Voices from beyond the discipline's boundaries are even further disadvantaged because they lack the basic legitimacy required in the contemporary culture of experts. This point is underlined by the disproportionate impact made by the numerous “conversions on retirement” undergone by those previously prominent in the security field (among the strategic confessionals to make an impact in the 1980s were Carver 1982; Bundy et al. 1982; Generals for Peace and Disarmament 1984; McNamara 1986; for a more recent manifestation of this phenomena in the context of demands for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, see Sauer [forthcoming]). When those people who have had, for example, a role in the development, deployment, or justification of nuclear weapons subsequently declare themselves to be dissatisfied with their efficacy or morality, these declarations are given far greater weight than the arguments of so-called nonexperts even when the substance of those arguments are identical. The innate conservatism of traditional security discourse is further reinforced by the way in which so many intellectuals (journalists and academics) active in the security field have been co-opted by the security establishments in many states (a standard study is Horowitz 1963). Such is the extent of the ties between security intellectuals and the security sector of both governments and the economy that it may be valid to posit the existence of what has been called the “military-industrial-academic complex.” Even if this characterization is exaggerated, there is considerable prima facie evidence to suggest that many benefits accrue to those who refrain from rocking the boat. Conversely, those who insist on challenging the hegemonic ideas not only have to contend with a very deeply entrenched orthodoxy but are also unlikely to share some of the material and professional benefits enjoyed by their less radical colleagues (see, for example, Booth 1997a: 96–97).

#### They are missing the point – our argument isn’t that their affirmative is an inherently securitized gesture -- this is a performative speech act—they have to be responsible for their framing of the plan

Stefan Elbe, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sussex, March 2006. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, p. 124.//VP

By way of extension, for Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, labeling an issue a security issue also constitutes such a performative speech act. For them (1998:26) security ‘‘is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a prom- ise, naming a ship).’’ Security is thus not viewed by these three scholars as something that exists independently of its discursive articulation,13 but rather as a particular form of performative speech act; security is a social quality political actors, such as intelligence agencies, government officials, and international organizations, inject into issues by publicly portraying them as existential threats (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998:204). Whereas more traditional approaches to security operate within a specific definition of security, revolving for example around the deployment of armed force in world politics, and then seek to ascertain empirically whether an issue genuinely represents a security threat, for securitization theory the designation of an issue as a security threat is primarily an intersubjective practice undertaken by security policy makers. ‘‘It is a choice to phrase things in security . . . terms, not an objective feature of the issue . . . .’’ (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998:211); or, as Wæver (1995:65) put it elsewhere, the ‘‘[u]se of the security label does not merely reflect whether a problem is a security problem, it is also a political choice, that is, a decision for conceptualization in a special way.’’

#### Empirics are insufficient to determine that threats are real – not all actors have the power to make their empirical contexts heard

**Abrahamsen, 2005 – Professor of International Politics at University of Wales** [Rita, blair's africa: the politics of securitization and fear, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 30, No, 1 (Jan-Mar. 2005), pp 55-80, 29/07/13]

By regarding the utterance itself as the primary reality, the approach of the Copenhagen school allows in principle for an almost indefinite expansion of the security agenda. In practice, however, it is not the case that anything and everything can be securitized or that any "securitizing actor" can attempt to securitize any issue and referent object.9 Different actors have very different capacities to make effective claims about threats and to present them in forms that will be recognized and accepted as convincing by the relevant audiences. In short, not all claims are socially effec- tive, and not all actors are in equally powerful positions to make them. Similarly, while empirical contexts provide crucial resources and referents for actors attempting to securitize an issue, they can- not ultimately determine what are accepted as security issues or threats.10 Rather than wholly open and expandable then, the secu- ritizing speech act is deeply sedimented and structured, rhetori- cally and culturally as well as institutionally.11

# 1NR

## Russia

#### The idea Russia is a threat is a dirty lie that conflates the current system with a paranoid fear that triggers the threat spiral causing a self fulfilling prophecy.

**Jæger** 20**00** (Øyvind @ Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. *Peace and Conflict Studies* 7.2 “Securitizing Russia: Discursive Practice of the Baltic States” shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf”, MT)

Security, to be sure, is about the sovereignty and survival of the state as such – the state as an independent political unit. That does not, however, necessarily imply a privileging of the military sector of the state as is the case with classical security. Following Ole Wæver (1997a; 1995; 1994), what pertains to security should be looked at as the speech-act of politics the discursive practice of doing by saying which is at work when states, not least the Baltic ones, are seeking to secure state formations. What is an issue of security, and what not, is delineated through speech-acts in a performative discursive practice coined by Ole Wæver (1997a; 1995; 1994) as securitisation, making security issues of what is spoken of as security: One speaks security, and therefore it is a matter of security. As with sovereignty (cf. Walker 1993), security has no ontological basis outside of discourse. An army is not a

threat in and of itself – it is merely an army – but becomes one when denoted in terms of danger. Conceiving of security as a speech-act, Wæver argues that security is not something "out there" with an objective existence and a priori ontology, something that one should strive to acquire as much of as one possibly can. On the contrary, security is an act that comes into play by the very utterance of the word security. Security is a field of practice into which subject matters can be inserted as well as exempted. Security is a code for going about a particular business in very particular ways. By labeling an issue a security issue, that is, a threat to security, one legitimises the employment of extraordinary measures to counter the threat, because it threatens security. In other words, security is a self-referential practice that carries its own legitimisation and justification. Security issues are allotted priority above everything else because everything else is irrelevant if sovereignty is lost, the state loses independence and ceases to exist. This makes for the point that it is not security as an objective or a state of affairs that is the crux of understanding security, but rather the typical operations and modalities by which security comes into play, Wæver (1995) notes.15 The typical operations are **speech-acts** and the modality threat-defence sequences. That is, **perceiving** and **conveying** **threats** and **calling** upon **defence** hold back the **alleged threat**. This is also a self-referential practice with the dynamic of a security dilemma: Defensive measures taken with reference to a perceived threat cause **increased** **sense** **of** **insecurity** and new calls for defence, and so forth. Wæver’s argument is that this logic is at work also in other fields than those busying themselves with military defence of sovereignty. Moreover, viewing security as a speech act not only makes it possible to include different sectors in a study of security, and thus open up the concept. It also clears the way for resolving security concerns by desecuritising issues which through securitisation have raised the concern in the first place. Knowing the logic of securitisation and pinning it down when it is at work carries the possibility of reversing the process by advocating other modalities for dealing with a given issue unluckily cast as a matter of security. What is perceived as a threat and therefore invoking defence, **triggering** the **spiral**, might be **perceived of otherwise,** namely as a matter of political discord to be resolved by means of ordinary political conduct, (i.e. not by rallying in defence of sovereignty). A call for more security **will not eliminate threats and dangers**. It **is a call for more insecurity** as it will **reproduce threats and perpetuate a security problem.** As Wæver (1994:8)16 puts it:"Transcending a security problem, politicizing a problem can therefore not happen through thematization in terms of security, only away from it." That is what de-securitisation is about. David Campbell (1992) has taken the discursive approach to security one step further. He demonstrates that security is pretty much the business of (state) identity. His argument is developed from the claim that foreign policy is a discourse of danger that came to replace Christianity’s evangelism of fear in the wake of the Westphalian peace. But the effects of a "evangelism of fear" and a discourse of danger are similar – namely to produce a certitude of identity by depicting difference as otherness. As the Peace of Westphalia signified the replacement of church by state, faith by reason, religion by science, intuition by experience and tradition by modernity, the religious identity of salvation by othering evil ("think continually about death in order to avoid sin, because sin plus death will land you in hell"17 –so better beware of Jews, heretics, witches and temptations of the flesh) was replaced by a hidden ambiguity of the state. Since modernity’s privileging of reason erased the possibility of grounding social organisation in faith, it had to be propped up by reason and the sovereign state as a anthropomorphic representation of sovereign Man was offered as a resolution. But state identity cannot easily be produced by reason alone. The problem was, however, that once the "death of God" had been proclaimed, the link between the world, "man" and certitude had been broken (Campbell 1992: 53). Thus ambiguity prevailed in the modernist imperative that every presumption grounded in faith be revealed by reason, and on the other hand, that the privileging of modernity, the state, and reason itself is not possible without an element of faith. In Campbell’s (1992: 54) words: In this context of incipient ambiguity brought upon by an insistence that can no longer be grounded, securing identity in the form of the state requires an emphasis on the unfinished and endangered nature of the world. In other words, discourses of "danger" are central to the discourses of the "state" and the discourses of "man". In place of the spiritual certitude that provided the vertical intensity to support the horizontal extenciveness of Christendom, the state requires discourses of "danger" to provide a new theology of truth about who and what "we" are by highlighting who and what "we" are not, and what "we" have to fear. The mode through which the Campbellian discourse of danger is employed in foreign (and security) policy, can then be seen as practices of Wæverian securitisation. Securitisation is the mode of discourse and the discourse is a "discourse of danger" identifying and **naming** **threats**, thereby **delineating** **Self** **from** **Other** and thus making it clear what it is "we" are protecting, (i.e. what is "us", what is our identity and therefore – as representation – what is state identity). This is done by pointing out danger, threats and enemies, internal and external alike, and – by linking the two (Campbell 1992: 239): For the state, identity can be understood as the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the "inside" are linked through a discourse of danger (such as Foreign Policy) with threats identified and located on the "outside". **To speak security is then to employ a discourse of danger** inter-subjectively **depicting that which is different from Self as an existential threat** – and therefore as Other to Self. Securitisation is about the identity of that which is securitised on behalf of, a discursive practice to (re)produce the identity of the state. Securitising implies "othering" difference – making difference the Other in a **binary** **opposition** constituting Self (Neumann 1996b: 167). Turning to the Baltic Sea Region, one cannot help noting the rather loose fitting between the undeniable – indeed underscored – state focus in the works of both David Campbell and the Copenhagen School on the one hand, and the somewhat wishful speculations of regionality beyond the state – transcending sovereignty – on the other. Coupling the two is not necessarily an analytical problem. It only makes a rather weak case for regionality. But exactly that becomes a theoretical problem in undermining the very theoretical substance, and by implication – empirical viability – of regionality. There are of course indications that the role of states are relativised in late modern (or post- modern) politics. And there is reason to expect current developments in the security problematique of the Baltic states – firmly connected to the dynamic of NATO’s enlargement – to exert an impact on regional co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region, possibly even on regionality. NATO moving east, engaging Russia and carrying elements of the post-modernist security agenda with it in the process, is likely to narrow the gap between the two agendas. Moreover, since the Baltic states are not included in a first round of expansion, they might in this very fact (failure, some would say) find an incentive for shifting focus from international to regional levels. Involving Poland and engaging Russia, the enlargement of NATO will in fact bring the Alliance as such (not only individual NATO countries as the case has been) to bear increasingly on the regional setting as well as on regional activity. That might add significance to the regional level. It does not, however, necessarily imply that the state as actor and state centric approaches will succumb to regionality. Neither does it do away with the state as the prime referent for, and producer of, collective identity, so central to the approaches of both Wæver and Campbell. But it might spur a parallel to sovereignty. A way out of this theoretical impasse would then be not to stress the either or of regionality/sovereignty, but to see the two as organising principles at work side by side, complementing each other in parallelity rather than excluding one another in contrariety. The Discourse of Danger: The Russian war on Chechnya is one event that was widely interpreted in the Baltic as a ominous sign of what Russia has in store for the Baltic states (see Rebas 1996: 27; Nekrasas 1996: 58; Tarand 1996: 24; cf. Haab 1997). The constitutional ban in all three states on any kind of association with post-Soviet political structures is indicative of **a threat perception that confuses Soviet and post- Soviet, conflating Russia with the USSR and casting everything Russian as a threat** **through** what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) call **a discursive "chain of equivalence**". In this the value of one side in a **binary opposition** is **reiterated** in other denotations of the same binary opposition. Thus, the value **"Russia"** in a Russia/Europe-opposition is also **denoted by "instability**", "Asia", **"invasion", "chaos",** "incitement of ethnic minorities", **"unpredictability", "imperialism",** "slander campaign", "migration", and so forth. The opposite value of these markers ("stability", "Europe", "defence", "order", and so on) would then denote the Self and thus conjure up an identity. When identity is precarious, **this discursive practice intensifies by shifting onto a security mode**, treating the oppositions as if they were questions of political existence, sovereignty, and survival. Identity is (re)produced more effectively when the oppositions are employed in a discourse of in-security and danger, that is, made into questions of national security and thus securitised in the Wæverian sense. In the Baltic cases, especially the Lithuanian National Security Concept is knitting a chain of equivalence in a ferocious discourse of danger. Not only does it establish "[t]hat the defence of Lithuania is total and unconditional," and that "[s]hould there be no higher command, self-controlled combat actions of armed units and citizens shall be considered legal." (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 1, 2) It also posits that [t]he power of civic resistance is constituted of the Nation’s Will and self-determination to fight for own freedom, of everyone citizen’s resolution to resist to [an] assailant or invader by all possible ways, despite citizen’s age and [or] profession, of taking part in Lithuania’s defence (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 4). When this is added to the identifying of the objects of national security as "human and citizen rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; state sovereignty; rights of the nation, prerequisites for a free development; the state independence; the constitutional order; state territory and its integrity, and; cultural heritage," and the subjects as "the state, the armed forces and other institutions thereof; the citizens and their associations, and; non governmental organisations,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 2, Sc. 1, 2) one approaches a conception of security in which the distinction between state and nation has disappeared in all-encompassing securitisation. Everyone is expected to defend everything with every possible means. And when the list of identified threats to national security that follows range from "overt (military) aggression", via "personal insecurity", to "ignoring of national values,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 10) the National Security Concept of Lithuania has become a totalising one taking everything to be a question of national security. The chain of equivalence is established when the very introduction of the National Security Concept is devoted to a denotation of Lithuania’s century-old sameness to "Europe" and resistance to "occupation and subjugation" (see quotation below), whereby Russia is depicted and installed as the first link in the discursive chain that follows.

#### Terrorists won’t pursue or use nuclear weapons

**Waltz, 03** (Kenneth, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2003, p. 130)

For terrorists who abandon tactics of disruption and harassment in favor of dealing in wholesale death and destruction, instruments other than nuclear weapons are more readily available. Poisons and germs are easier to get than nuclear weapons, and poisoning a city’s water supply, though rather complicated, is more easily done than blowing a city up. Nevertheless, terrorists may seek to gain control of nuclear materials and use them to threaten or destroy. Yet, with shaky control of nuclear weapons materials in Russia and perhaps in Pakistan, and with the revelation in 1994 that the United States had lost track of some of its nuclear materials, one can hardly believe that nuclear weapons spreading to another country or two every now and then adds much to the chances that terrorists will be able to buy or steal nuclear materials. Plentiful sources are already available. Nuclear terror is a problem distinct from the spread of nuclear weapons to a few more countries. Terrorists have done a fair bit of damage by using conventional weapons and have sometimes got their way by threatening to use them. Might terrorists not figure they can achieve more still by threatening to explode nuclear weapons on cities of countries they may wish to bend to their bidding? Fear of nuclear terror arises from the assumption that if terrorists *can* get nuclear weapons they *will* get them, and then all hell will break loose. This is comparable to assuming that if weak states get nuclear weapons, they will use them for aggression. Both assumptions are false. Would the courses of action we fear, if followed, promise more gains than losses or more pains than profits? The answers are obvious. Terrorists have some hope of reaching their long-term goals through patient pressure and constant harassment. They cannot hope to do so by issuing unsustainable threats to wreak great destruction, threats they would not want to execute anyway.

## Spills

#### Their sole focus on global warming blocks broader efforts to reduce consumption, and displaces concern for other environmental issues –– that makes extinction inevitable

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While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve “the problem.” Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun’s rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living.”16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet’s predicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisis—a crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to—will barely address—the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.